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INTRODUCTION 
Are you twenty-eight years old, feel encumbered by the 
past, and find yourself unable to achieve your initial promise?  
Do you think it’s about time to get your head in the cloud?  
“Yes,” replied the Stored Communications Act.1  Four years 
before the introduction of the World Wide Web, Congress 
passed the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) as part of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) in 1986 to 
govern access to electronically stored communications.2  
Premised on the 1980’s computer technology, the SCA 
represented a remarkably progressive statutory framework 
that established privacy safeguards for emerging 
technologies.3 
Outdated and disjointed nearly three decades later, the 
SCA finds itself struggling to maintain applicability and 
legitimacy amidst the recent thunderstorm of technological 
innovation.  Today, the SCA provides a tangled web of 
“Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections, regulating the 
relationship between government investigators and [Internet] 
service providers in possession of users’ private information.”4 
Today’s Americans, more forward thinking than ever 
before, have their heads in the cloud.  The cloud represents a 
 
 1. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). 
 2. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 3. See Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Electronic Communications: The 
Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
349, 351 (2009). 
 4. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004) 
[hereinafter Kerr, SCA User’s Guide]. 
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transformative computing model where users share or store 
their information on remote servers owned or operated by 
third parties.5  Files once confined to one’s home are now 
readily accessible in his or her respective virtual home with 
the simple tap of a finger on any Internet-connected device.6 
As society increasingly turns away from the personal 
computing model, the recent proliferation of cloud computing 
engenders considerable uncertainty as to the SCA’s scope of 
privacy protections to communications stored in the cloud.7  
The SCA’s inability to guarantee constitutional privacy 
protections in the current technological landscape—
unanticipated by Congress in 1986—will undermine 
consumer and corporate trust, and consequently, stifle 
technological innovation. 
It is crucial for Congress to look at clouds from both sides 
now, because the SCA really doesn’t consider clouds at all.8  
This Comment argues that the existing statutory framework 
inadequately protects cloud users and propositions Congress 
to amend the SCA so as to not marginalize individuals who 
migrate their data from their in-home filing cabinets to their 
digital lockers in the cloud.  The SCA should ensure parity 
between content stored physically and electronically. 
Parts I through V provide the foundation for this 
discussion by exploring the cloud and the applicable 
constitutional and statutory doctrines.  Together, Parts VI 
and VII demonstrate that the SCA’s archaic framework has 
created a fragmented set of privacy protections that leave 
cloud-computing platforms outside the statute’s protection.  
Finally, Part VIII proposes statutory amendments that 
adequately reflect the existing technological landscape while 
providing flexibility for emerging technologies as they become 
relevant.  Having argued that data in the cloud should receive 
 
 5. Robert Gellman, Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and 
Confidentiality From Cloud Computing (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.world 
privacyforum.org/pdflWPFCloud PrivacyReport.pdf. 
 6. How Cloud Computing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM http://computer. 
howstuffworks. com/cloud-computing/cloud-computing.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 
2013). 
 7. See e.g., Ilana R. Kattan, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored 
Communications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in 
the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 619 (2011) (explaining that the 
personal computing model is a model “in which users access, store, and manage 
their data and processing locally on their own PCs.”). 
 8. JONI MITCHELL, BOTH SIDES NOW (Reprise 1969). 
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protection comparable to their tangible equivalents, Part VIII 
advocates for “tech neutrality,” where, regardless of future 
developments in communication technology, the presence and 
application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
remain constant.9 
I. CLOUD COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
Cloud computing represents a dynamic technological and 
computational advance.  With about 69% of United States 
Internet users currently utilizing cloud-based platforms and 
with $241 billon industry forecasts by 2020, experts project 
cloud computing to revolutionize “how businesses function, 
how cities are planned, and how people carry out their 
work.”10  This section will detail the technological landscape 
that facilitated the cloud’s evolution, define cloud computing 
and its variations, and explain how individuals utilize the 
cloud. 
A. Technological Landscape & Evolution 
While the cloud computing paradigm recently gained 
traction as a trendy and widespread infrastructure, its 
underlying concepts are derivative of 1960s technologies: 
mainframe and personal computing models.11  
Firmsrecognizing the then-inordinate costs to acquire, 
maintain, and operate mainframe computersessentially 
acted as landlords and allowed users to “operate on slices of a 
central server’s time and resources.”12  This technological real 
estate market quickly dissipated during the following two 
decades with the advent of the fairly inexpensive 
minicomputer.13  In the 1990s, Application Service Providers 
(“ASPs”) quickly emerged as industry leaders, providing 
standardized, fully provisioned, and fully maintained 
 
 9. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A 
General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Fourth 
Amendment to the Internet]. 
 10. Jay P. Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control in Cloud 
Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 341, 356 (2013). 
 11. See John Soma et al., Chasing the Clouds Without Getting Drenched: A 
Call for Fair Practices in Cloud Computing Services, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 193, 
196 (2011). 
 12. Id. 
 13. ANDY MULHOLLAND ET AL., ENTERPRISE CLOUD COMPUTING: A 
STRATEGY GUIDE FOR BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY LEADERS 15 (2010). 
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applications accessible over Internet-connected personal 
computers.14  Just as quickly as the ASPs dissipated 
alongside the rubble of the dot-com bust, the arrival of 
virtualization technologies, ubiquitous Internet deployment, 
commoditizing of hardware, and software standardization set 
the stage for shared-services computing’s comeback 
performance.15 
B. Defining the Cloud 
In the midst of an August 2006 address at the Search 
Engine Strategies Conference, Google, Inc. CEO Eric Schmidt 
gave wind to the term, “cloud computing,” by referring to 
software applications hosted on remote servers.16  The cloud 
is a collection of interconnected computers and servers 
publically accessible via the Internet.17  In network 
diagrams—comprised of servers, client PCs, switches, 
routers, and the Internet—the cloud icon represents the 
overarching element that allows the network to function.18  
Consisting of networks, remote web-based applications, and 
remote data storage, cloud computing essentially represents a 
metaphor for the Internet.19 
Despite significant efforts to define cloud computing, its 
existing definitions vary and will likely be refined when the 
paradigm becomes better understood.20  The National 
Institute of Standards & Technology (“NIST”) defines cloud 
computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, 
on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Soma et al., supra note 11, at 196–97; see also, Soma et al., supra 
note 11, at n.11 (“‘ Virtualization’  is a method of running multiple independent 
virtual operating systems on a single physical computer.”); see generally Soma 
et al., supra note 11 (explaining that “Commoditizing of hardware” is the mass 
production and ease of access as well as the identical nature of hardware). 
 16. See Jacob M. Small, Storing Documents in the Cloud: Toward an 
Evidentiary Privilege Protecting Papers and Effects Stored on the Internet, 23 
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 255, 258 (2013). 
 17. See id. at 258–59. 
 18. See Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1623, 1626 (2013). 
 19. See ANTHONY T. VELTE ET AL., CLOUD COMPUTING: A PRACTICAL 
APPROACH 3–4 (2010); see also Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: 
Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 360–61 (2010). 
 20. William R. Denny, Survey of Recent Developments in the Law of Cloud 
Computing and Software as a Service Agreement, 66 BUS. LAW. 237, 237 (2010). 
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computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned 
and released with minimal management effort or service 
provider interaction.”21  To simplify NIST’s definition, cloud 
computing is “a different way for people to use their 
computers.”22 
C. Using the Cloud 
While computer users of earlier decades needed to 
maintain specialized software on their hard drives to 
accomplish various tasks, the cloud securely delivers that 
sophisticated technology as a virtual platform on the Internet 
at the physical access-point on an as-needed basis.23  Located 
in data centers around the world, thousands of computers 
handle data processing and storage for millions of users.24  
Users enjoy anywhere access to their files and applications 
once they move their content to the cloud.25 
Clouds take on several different structures and functions 
depending on the varying needs of the end-users, provider’s 
framework, and service exchange.26  Organizations deploy 
clouds in two predominant ways: (1) privately on the 
organization’s infrastructure, or (2) publically over the 
Internet as a fee-based, advertiser-supported service.27  While 
private cloud users encounter similar risks as public cloud 
users, the public cloud is the foremost concern for policy 
makers and industry leaders.28 
The industry generally partitions public clouds into three 
 
 21. PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L. INST. OF STANDARDS AND 
TECH., THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (Sept. 2011), available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf. 
 22. Small, supra note 16, at 259. 
 23. See Kesan et al., supra note 10, at 355. 
 24. See Soghoian, supra note 19, at 364. 
 25. See Darlene Bedley, A Look at the Proposed Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011: Where Is Smart Grid Technology, and 
How Does Inevitable Discovery Apply?, 36 NOVA L. REV. 521, 524 (2012). 
 26. See Jenna Gerber, Head Out of the Clouds: What the United States May 
Learn from the European Union’s Treatment of Data in the Cloud, 23 IND. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 245, 247 (2013). 
 27. See Timothy D. Martin, Hey! You! Get Off of My Cloud: Defining and 
Protecting the Metes and Bounds of Privacy, Security, and Property in Cloud 
Computing, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 283, 287 (2010). 
 28. See Brad Smith, Microsoft Urges Government and Industry to Work 
Together to Build Confidence in the Cloud, MICROSOFT (Oct. 20, 2013, 8:45 PM), 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2010/jan10/1-20brookingspr.aspx 
(Senior Vice President and General Counsel). 
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service models based on the distinct capabilities offered to the 
consumer: (1) Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”), (2) Platform-as-
a-Service (“PaaS”), and (3) Infrastructure-as-a-Service 
(“IaaS”).29  SaaS involves the “capability provided to the 
consumer . . . to use the provider’s applications running on a 
cloud infrastructure.”30  PaaS involves the “capability 
provided to the consumer . . . to deploy onto the cloud 
infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications 
created using programming languages and tools supported by 
the provider.”31  IaaS involves the “capability provided to the 
consumer . . . to provision processing, storage, networks, and 
other fundamental computing resources . . . IaaS providers 
supply only the necessary resources that organizations 
require.”32 
Businesses and users migrate their content to the cloud, 
as its delivery model provides alluring advantages to both 
service providers and end-users alike.33  Service providers 
benefit from their enhanced ability to readily deny or 
terminate access to troublesome users, heighten security, and 
guard sensitive intellectual property and technology.34  When 
software is delivered via the Internet, unauthorized copying 
is virtually nonexistent.35  Where users are unable to host the 
tools on their own servers, and where cloud products’ 
computation and coding remain tightly held on the given 
provider’s servers, cloud providers do not encounter the 
infamous and illegal network-sharing of expensive and 
essential technology such as Microsoft Office, Adobe 
 
 29. See Gerber, supra note 26, at 247. 
 30. Hien Timothy M. Nguyen, Cloud Cover: Privacy Protections and the 
Stored Communications Act in the Age of Cloud Computing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2189, 2201 (2011) (ranging from productivity applications such as word 
processing to entertainment hubs providing video and music). 
 31. See, e.g., id. (discussing how Microsoft’s Windows Azure provides the 
function to build applications spanning from consumer Web to enterprise 
scenarios). 
 32. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and 
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 113 (2010) (statement of The Computer & 
Communications Industry Association) (“IaaS offers full-service virtual 
information stacks designed to replace a company’s entire server room and 
network through virtualization technology.”); see also, Ngyuen, supra note 30, 
at 2201 (discussing how Netflix is moving its existing Internet technology to the 
cloud via Amazon Web Services). 
 33. See Soma et al., supra note 11, at 201. 
 34. Soghoian, supra note 19, at 364. 
 35. Id. 
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Photoshop, and the like.36  Similarly, trade secrets, such as 
algorithms, that exist for such programs and applications are 
considerably less accessible by competitors, as reverse 
engineering is exceptionally difficult.37 
Many cloud computing applications and services are 
consumer-oriented.38  End-users enjoy either free or 
inexpensive technologies, offering many of the same, basic 
features found on their desktop counterparts, and more.39  By 
sharing resources across numerous users, cloud platforms 
significantly enhance users’ abilities to work collaboratively.40  
End-users benefit from the cloud’s data preservation and 
overwhelming accessibility: users may access applications 
and data from any device, anywhere in the world, provided 
they have some sort of Internet connection.41  As applications 
run directly from the cloud, cloud computing provides a 
simple solution to computer memory and storage capacity 
issues.42  Alongside eliminating hard drive capacity issues, 
cloud computing similarly eliminates hard drive failure 
concerns.43  Cloud services regularly back up files on multiple 
servers, giving users solace in that their files will never be 
lost.44 
The cloud’s abundant benefits are not without risk.  
Migrating data to the cloud necessarily suggests that users 
relinquish some dominion over that data.45  The ominous rain 
cloud that looms over this innovative paradigm is privacy, or 
the lack thereof.  While the right to privacy represents “the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men,”46 conceptualizing this right in the cloud is a 
perplexing endeavor. 
Uncertainty as to privacy in the cloud should give pause 
to users, providers, legislators, and judges alike.  While no 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 365. 
 38. See id. at 356–66. 
 39. See Tina Cheng, A Cloudy Forecast: Divergence in the Cloud Computing 
Laws of the United States, European Union, and China, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 481, 484–85 (2013). 
 40. See Martin, supra note 27, at 297. 
 41. See Kesan et al., supra note 10, at 362. 
 42. Cheng, supra note 39, at 484. 
 43. See Paul Lanois, Caught in the Clouds: The Web 2.0, Cloud Computing, 
and Privacy?, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 29, 29–30 (2010). 
 44. Cheng, supra note 39, at 484. 
 45. See Martin, supra note 27, at 300. 
 46. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
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law expressly addresses privacy in the cloud, a cursory glance 
at United States privacy law—both constitutional and 
statutory—lends credence to the principle of safeguarding 
user-privacy in the cloud.47 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment, applicable to federal, state, and 
local investigators,48 serves as the primary regulator of law 
enforcement conduct in the course of physical-world criminal 
investigations.49  It provides, “the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”50  
The Fourth Amendment requires that the government submit 
a particular description of the places to be searched and the 
things to be seized.51  While an all-encompassing 
reasonableness standard provides the Fourth Amendment 
with procedural legitimacy,52 the Supreme Court administers 
the amendment’s goal by creating exacting standards that 
proscribe what law enforcement can do, when, and under 
what circumstances.53 
The Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he overriding 
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the personal 
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the 
state.”54  “It is not the breaking of his doors, and the 
 
 47. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 
1860–68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10 (2006)). 
 48. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1961) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 49. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How A 
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
805, 810 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Lifting the Fog]. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 
(1987) (describing the particularity required in a warrant for the places to be 
searched); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 474 (1976) (describing 
the permissible breadth of warranted seizures). 
 52. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (noting that the 
Fourth Amendment’s “central requirement is one of reasonableness.”). 
 53. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and 
the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1164 (1998). 
 54. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (finding no Fourth 
Amendment violation where a police officer directed a physician to draw a blood 
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rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the 
offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”55 
A. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Notwithstanding the apparently extensive protection 
offered by the Fourth Amendment, not all government action 
that uncovers probative evidence constitutes a “search” 
within the Fourth Amendment context.56  Accordingly, the 
Fourth Amendment does not guard against all searches in all 
areas.57 
Katz v. United States58 denotes the Court’s modern era 
privacy doctrine.59  Katz arose when government agents, 
without a search warrant, attached a listening device to the 
exterior of a public phone booth—from which Katz made a 
call—in order to eavesdrop on the defendant’s telephone 
conversation.60  In finding the contents of the phone 
conversation protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
emphasized that what a person seeks to maintain as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, is sacrosanct under 
the Fourth Amendment.61 
Justice Harlan, concurring in judgment, canonized the 
penumbral privacy doctrine: the reasonable expectation of 
privacy.62 Under his twofold adage, an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy where: (1) the individual 
demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) 
where the expectation is objectively reasonable, i.e. “one that 
society is prepared to recognize” as such.63  The courts have 
since embraced Justice Harlan’s two-fold approach to assess 
 
sample from a drunk driving suspect). 
 55. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (holding that compelling 
a criminal defendant to produce incriminating documents constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search). 
 56. See Scolnik, supra note 3, at 353 (citing an example from Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) where a drug-detecting dog’s sniff did not 
constitute a search). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 59. See Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection 
Erodes As E-Mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U.L. REV. 1043, 1047 (2008). 
 60. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 349. 
 61. See id. at 353. 
 62. See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 361. 
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the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.64 
B. The Third Party Doctrine 
While the Fourth Amendment may protect individuals 
from unreasonable searches of items he or she maintains as 
private, the Court somewhat undermined the initial promise 
of Katz when propounding subsequent doctrines.65  The Court 
developed the third party doctrine, which functions as a 
coherent guideline in defining the reasonableness of an 
individual’s expectation of privacy.66 
Under the third party doctrine, an individual 
relinquishes his or her reasonable expectation of privacy 
when he or she knowingly reveals private information to 
another person, effectively assuming the risk that the other 
person will reveal the once-private information to the 
government.67  If the third party willingly conveys that 
information to such authorities, the government may then 
use the once private material against the individual.68 
Couch v. United States69 demarcates the Court’s first 
encounter with the third party doctrine jurisprudence.  Couch 
argued that the Fourth Amendment protected documents 
that the IRS subpoenaed from her accountant.70  The Court 
held that an individual could not assert a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to preclude the government from subpoenaing tax 
records in her accountant’s possession.71  Since an accountant 
necessarily reviews and hands over a client’s documents when 
filing a tax return, Couch—by divesting such records to her 
accountant—relinquished her reasonable expectation of 
privacy in those documents.72 
Expanding Couch, the Court in United States v. Miller73 
found that a bank customer retained no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the financial documents he 
 
 64. See Scolnik, supra note 3, at 353. 
 65. See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic 
Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1577 (2004). 
 66. See Small, supra note 16, at 262. 
 67. See Oza, supra note 59, at 1047. 
 68. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984). 
 69. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). 
 70. See Small, supra note 16, at 264. 
 71. See Couch, 409 U.S. at 336. 
 72. See Small, supra note 16, at 264. 
 73. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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“voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their 
employees in the ordinary course of business.”74  Despite 
Miller’s subjective expectation of privacy, an objective 
expectation could not exist with regard to the checks, deposit 
slips, and financial statements freely disclosed to the bank 
and its employees, as “the depositor takes the risk, in 
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be 
conveyed by that person to the government.”75 
The Court then applied the third party doctrine to 
electronic communications in Smith v. Maryland.76  Without a 
search warrant, the police installed a pen register at the 
company’s central office as a surveillance technique to record 
numbers dialed from defendant Smith’s line.77  While Smith 
asserted a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search and 
seizure of the telephone number he dialed, the Court inferred 
that, because customers received itemized bills listing the 
long-distance calls they made, “telephone users, in sum, 
typically know that they must convey numerical information 
to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities 
for recording this information; and that the phone company 
does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate 
business purposes.”78 
Absent statutory guidance, the courts would be left to 
determine the breadth of the third party doctrine with respect 
to electronic communications through case law, which would 
invariably lead to inconsistencies.79  The case law regarding 
the Fourth Amendment’s application to Internet 
communications remains remarkably sparse and, 
unfortunately for users, the existing case law does little to 
safeguard their digital documents that are increasingly being 
stored on remote third-party servers.80  As such, Congress, as 
opposed to the courts, has the appropriate faculties and 
institutional advantage to forage the complex technological 
landscape and accordingly develop a statutory scheme to 
which the courts will defer.81 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 443. 
 76. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 77. See id. at 742–43. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Small, supra note 16, at 262. 
 80. See Soghoian, supra note 19, at 390. 
 81. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
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III. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF 
1986 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(“ECPA”) represents a Congressional endeavor to prevent the 
Fourth Amendment’s third party doctrine from compromising 
the privacy interests of electronic communications stored by 
third parties.82  The ECPA is one of the nation’s premier 
digital privacy laws.83  While the Fourth Amendment applies 
exclusively to government intrusions, Congress, recognizing 
that private parties pose a serious threat to Internet privacy, 
defined the scenarios in which an individual may reasonably 
maintain an expectation of privacy with regard to his or her 
electronic communications.84 
In the mid-1980s, consensus was reached among 
members of Congress, the telecommunications industry, and 
the computing industry that the nation’s developing 
technologies were significantly out of tune with their 
respective federal surveillance law and privacy safeguards.85  
The House Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs ascertained the urgency 
for updating legal protections for electronic communications.86  
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Patrick Leahy, 
stated that the “ [then-] existing law [was] ‘hopelessly out of 
date.’ ”87  An expert testifying at the House Committee 
hearing said it was “reasonable to assume that during the 
1990’s[,] electronic mail will become a regular and important 
part of the communications mix that a substantial number of 
Americans use.”88 
Reservations as to the ambiguity between privacy 
 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 838 
(2004) [hereinafter Kerr, Constitutional Myths]. 
 82. See Oza, supra note 59, at 1054. 
 83. See Gerber, supra note 26, at 257. 
 84. See Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 81, at 872. 
 85. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and 
Trademarks, Electronic Communication Privacy of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 130–31 (1985) (prepared statement of Jerry J. Berman, 
on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)). 
 86. S. REP. 99-541, 2 (1986). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice, 99th Cong. 20 (1985) (testimony of Philip M. Walker, 
General Regulatory Counsel, GTE Telenet Inc., and Vice Chairman, Electronic 
Mail Association, accompanied by Michael F. Cavanagh, Executive Director, 
Electronic Mail Association). 
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protections and law enforcement access standards with 
respect to electronic communications prompted the 
committees to ask the Office of Technology Assessment to 
evaluate threats posed by unregulated intrusions into 
electronically transmitted communications.89  The 1985 study 
determined that “ legal protections for electronic mail [were] 
‘weak, ambiguous, or non-existent,’ and that ‘electronic mail 
remain[ed] legally as well as technically vulnerable to 
unauthorized surveillance.’ ”90 
Congress amended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 196891 and consequently modernized the 
legislation, expanding its scope to a new category of electronic 
communications.92  Through the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, Congress ultimately extended then-existing wire 
and oral communication protections to the new electronic 
communications.93 
The ECPA consists of three federal statutes: (1) the 
Wiretap Act,94 (2) the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),95 
and (3) the Pen Register Statute.96  The Fifth Circuit 
evaluated the interaction between the ECPA and the SCA as 
follows: 
Congress’ use of the word ‘transfer’ in the definition of 
‘electronic communication,’ and its omission in that 
definition of the phrase ‘any electronic storage of such 
communication’ (part of the definition of ‘wire 
communication’) reflects that Congress did not intend for 
‘intercept’ to apply to ‘electronic communications’ when 
those communications are in ‘electronic storage.’ 97 
 
 89. See S. REP., supra note 86, at 5. 
 90. See id. at 4. 
 91. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968).  This statute represented the primary federal statute 
governing wire and oral communication interceptions.  See Nguyen supra note 
30, at 2215. 
 92. See Nicholas Matlach, Who Let the Katz Out? How the ECPA and SCA 
Fail to Apply to Modern Digital Communications and How Returning to the 
Principles in Katz v. United States Will Fix It, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 421, 
442 (2010). 
 93. See S. REP., supra note 86, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 
3559. 
 94. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22. 
 95. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10. 
 96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27. 
 97. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461–62 (5th 
Cir. 1994). 
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This interplay evinced a standard: the ECPA governs a 
communication transitioning between the source and the 
destination, while the SCA governs the communication once 
it reaches its destination.98  Accordingly, the Stored 
Communications Act is the principal legislation controlling 
online privacy rights, including e-mail and cloud computing.99 
IV. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
The way in which the Internet functions seemingly 
frustrates arguments for robust Fourth Amendment 
protection in remotely stored files under the current 
doctrine.100  The 1986 Senate ECPA Report recognized that a 
communication “subject to control by a third party computer 
operator” might, similar to the bank records in Miller, “be 
subject to no constitutional privacy protection.”101  In 
conjunction with changes in communications technology and 
content-proliferation, Congress enacted new privacy 
measures through the SCA.102  Congress acknowledged “[f]or 
the person or business whose records are involved, the 
privacy or proprietary interest in that information should not 
change” solely because the information is maintained and 
stored by a service provider as opposed to one’s person or 
one’s business premises.103  By statutorily codifying end-users’ 
privacy rights for their stored account information held by 
third party network service providers, the SCA addresses the 
inherent imbalances between the Fourth Amendment and the 
Internet’s function.104 
The SCA safeguards Fourth-Amendment privacy-like 
rights by supervising the interplay between service providers 
(who possess and maintain users’ private information) and 
government investigators.105  Chapter 121 of the United 
States Code is comprised of two principal sections: Section 
2702 (voluntary disclosure of customer communications or 
 
 98. See Matlach, supra note 92, at 448. 
 99. See Derek Constantine, Cloud Computing: The Next Great Technological 
Innovation, the Death of Online Privacy, or Both?, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 503 
(2012). 
 100. See Kerr, Lifting the Fog, supra note 49, at 806. 
 101. See S. REP., supra note 86, at 3. 
 102. See Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of 
Electronic Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 607 (2007). 
 103. See S. REP., supra note 86, at 3. 
 104. See Kerr, SCA User’s Guide, supra note 4, at 1212. 
 105. Id. 
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records) and Section 2703 (compelled disclosure of customer 
communications or records).106  For purposes of 
understanding relevant terminology, the discussion of Section 
2703 will precede the Section 2702 discussion. 
A. Section 2703: Compelled Governmental Access 
This section intricately sets forth the circumstances 
whereby service providers must disclose customer 
communications and information to government entities.  
Section 2703 provides three mechanisms by which the 
government compels disclosure: (1) search warrant, (2) court 
order, or (3) subpoena.107 
A search warrant requires the government to comply 
with the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement: 
given the totality of the circumstances, the government must 
establish, at a minimum, a fair probability that the defendant 
committed the crime.108  The other procedural mechanisms by 
their very nature fall short of the Fourth Amendment 
safeguards. 
The court order mandates that the government provide 
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or 
electronic communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”109  Use of a Section 2703(d) court order 
typically requires prior notice to the affected customer or 
subscriber.110  This standard represents an intermediate level 
that is lower than the search warrant’s probable cause but 
more exacting than the reasonable relevance standard 
required for subpoenas.111 
The third and most lenient standard is for a subpoena 
issued upon a showing of “reasonable relevance.”112  Under 
this standard, the government need only show that the 
information it seeks bears reasonable relevance to a criminal 
 
 106. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–03. 
 107. See id. § 2703(a)–(b). 
 108. See Kattan, supra note 7, at 630 (noting that the warrant does not 
require certainty). 
 109. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
 110. Id. § 2705. 
 111. See Sarah Salter, Storage and Privacy in the Cloud: Enduring Access to 
Ephemeral Messages, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 365, 375 (2010). 
 112. See Kattan, supra note 7, at 631. 
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investigation.113 
Under Section 2703, the point at which a governmental 
entity must obtain a search warrant supported by probable 
cause, or a less exacting form of process in order to compel 
disclosure of electronically stored communications, relies 
exclusively upon three distinctions: (1) content 
communication information and non-content communication 
information,114 (2) Electronic Communications Service (“ECS”) 
and Remote Computing Service (“RCS”),115 and (3) 
communications stored with an ECS for 180 days or less and 
communications stored with an ECS for over 180 days.116  
These fundamental distinctions yield varying levels of 
protection for electronically stored information.117 
1. The Content-Non-Content Dichotomy 
Here, the rules are the same for both ECS and RCS 
providers.118  Name and e-mail address of the recipient, for 
example, constitute non-content under the SCA.119  A warrant 
is never required where the government compels access to 
non-content information.120  Where the government seeks 
access to the “contents” of electronic communications—
”information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning 
of that communication”—maintained in “electronic storage,” 
however, the government may be required to obtain a search 
warrant consistent with its corresponding Fourth 
Amendment requirements.121 
2. Electronic Storage 
The ECPA defines electronic storage as “any temporary, 
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
 115. See id. § 2703(a)–(b). 
 116. See id. § 2703(c)(1). 
 117. Id. at 142. 
 118. See Kerr, SCA User’s Guide, supra note 4, at 1219. 
 119.  See Charles H. Kennedy, An ECPA for the 21st Century: The Present 
Reform Efforts and Beyond, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 129, 142 (2011) (the 
ECPA defines content as any information that assists with routing or 
addressing of a communications, identifies the time of the communication, or 
conveys information about a subscriber other than the contents of the 
subscriber falls outside of the content category). 
 120. See id. 
 121. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17); see generally 18 
U.S.C. § 2703; see Kennedy, supra note 119, at 141. 
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incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and . . . any 
storage of such communication by an electronic 
communications service for purposes of backup protection of 
such communication.”122 
While the ECPA provides a fairly straightforward 
definition of “electronic storage,” it has been the subject of 
much debate in practice.  The confusion exists between 
delivered and opened e-mails and those that remain in post-
transmission storage on the provider’s facilities.  A federal 
judge found the ECPA did not protect e-mails where such e-
mails remained stored after the recipient opened them.123  
They were in neither “temporary, immediate storage” nor 
“backup storage.”124  While the U.S. Department of Justice 
prefers this position, the Ninth Circuit took the opposite view 
and found e-mails protected by the ECPA, as post-
transmission storage served as a backup function.125 
3. The ECS-RCS Dichotomy 
The SCA defines an ECS as “any service which provides 
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications.”126  The SCA defines RCS as “the provision 
to the public of computer storage or processing services by 
means of an electronic communications system.”127  Where 
ECS-maintained communications must remain in “electronic 
storage” to receive any protections under the statute, RCS-
maintained contents receive their corresponding protections 
where (1) it is held or maintained on its customer’s behalf,128 
and where (2) the provider is authorized to access the 
communication’s contents only to provide such storage or 
services.129 
The ease with which the government can obtain an ECS 
 
 122. Id. § 2510(17). 
 123. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). 
 127. Id. § 2711(2) (defining “electronic communications system” as “any wire, 
radio, electromagnetic, photo-optical or photoelectric facilitates for the 
transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities or 
related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such 
communications.”). 
 128. See id. § 2703(b)(2)(A). 
 129. See id. § 2703(b)(2)(B). 
2015] BLUE SKIES AHEAD 485 
maintained communication depends exclusively on its time in 
“electronic storage.”  While the SCA mandates that the 
government procure a search warrant for contents stored for 
180 days or less, access to the same exact contents stored for 
over 180 days is less onerous as it may be obtained with the 
less exacting Section 2703(d) court order or subpoena.130  The 
SCA provides limited procedural safeguards to ECS 
communications stored for over 180 days and all RCS 
contents alike.131  Accordingly, the government may compel 
RCS providers to disclose contents by merely proffering a 
court order or subpoena. 
B. Section 2702: Voluntary Disclosures 
The Fourth Amendment neither limits the ability of 
private actors to voluntary disclose communications to the 
government, nor prevents service providers from releasing 
the contents of customer communications and information to 
other private parties.132  While Congress enacted Section 2702 
of the ECPA to remedy the Fourth Amendment’s shortcoming 
and to provide guidance as to when disclosure of particular 
communications and records is permitted, it did so through a 
seemingly incoherent compilation of categories, definitions, 
rules, and exceptions.133 
1. Non-Content Requests 
Public providers may disclose non-content information, 
without restriction, to any person other than a governmental 
entity.134  On the other hand, such content may only be 
disclosed to governmental entities where exceptionssuch as 
service of process by the governmental entityapply.135  Non-
public providers may voluntarily disclose non-content to any 
private or governmental entity, but may be required to 
 
 130. See id. § 2703(b)(1). 
 131. See id. § 2703(a)–(b). 
 132. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 137; see also United States v. Katz, 389 
U.S. 347, 351 (1967); and see United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 
(2010). 
 133. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)–(8). 
 134. See id. § 2703(c)(2) (Contents is defined in the ECPA: “[W]hen used with 
respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, [contents] include any 
information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.”). 
 135. See id. § 2702(c)(6); see also § 2703(c)(1). 
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produce such material upon service of process.136 
2. Content Requests to a Public ECS Provider 
ECS providers who offer services to the public may not 
divulge the contents of a communications to a private party 
unless the enumerated exceptions apply.137  Even in the event 
of civil litigation with corresponding civil subpoenas 
demanding such contents, the Section 2702 exceptions would 
be inapplicable, requiring the service provider to maintain 
the customer contents as private.138  Essentially, absent 
statutory exception or user consent, the provider must refuse 
the private party’s request. 
The circumstances differ where the government seeks 
production of customer communications and records.  
Voluntary disclosure to the government is not permitted; 
however, Section 2702 permits disclosure authorized by 
Section 2703.139  Accordingly compliance with governmental 
request for disclosure is allowed where the government 
procures a search warrant, subpoena, or court order.140 
3. Content Requests to a Non-Public ECS Provider 
As Section 2702 omits statutory obligations with respect 
 
 136. See id. §§ 2702(c)(1), (4), (6), 2703(c)(1).  See also Kennedy, supra note 
119, at 140 (“A public ECS or RCS provider may disclose non-content customer 
information to any non–governmental entity.  Disclosures of such information to 
governmental entities may be made only where an exception—such as consent 
of a party or subscriber or service of process by the governmental entity—
applies . . . . A non–public ECS or RCS provider may disclose non–content 
customer information to any private or governmental entity but may be 
compelled to do so only upon service of process.”). 
 137. See id. § 2702(b)–(c) (detailing the exceptions for communications and 
customer records, respectively: delivery to intended recipients of those 
communications and other lawful purposes “necessarily incident to the 
rendition of the services or to the protection of rights or property of the provider 
of that service,” or “with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or 
intended recipient of such communication.”). 
 138. See id.  Kennedy, supra, note 119, at 139 n.57 (“neither subpart’s 
exceptions covers subpoenas brought by nongovernmental litigants.”). 
 139. See id. § 2702(b)–(c). 
 140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(2), 2703(a)–(d).  See also, Kennedy, supra note 119, 
at 140 (“A public ECS or RCS provider may disclose the contents of a 
communication stored on its service to a governmental or non-governmental 
entity only where an exception—such as the consent of a party or subscriber or 
service of process by a governmental entity—applies . . . . A non–public ECS or 
RCS provider may voluntarily disclose the contents of a communication stored 
on its service to a private or governmental entity but may be compelled to do so 
only upon service of process.”). 
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to private networks and other entities that do not hold 
themselves out to serve the public, such providers may freely 
disclose contents to a private third party, subject to 
contractual privacy assurances the provider has given its 
users.141 
Since the non-public service provider is not subject to 
Section 2702, such providers are not required to adhere to 
Section 2703 when dealing with a governmental entity.142  
While it can freely disclose content to the government, the 
government cannot compel it to do so unless the government 
complies with disclosure mechanisms enumerated in Section 
2703.143 
V. ECPA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2013 
In September 2010, the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary held its first hearing on ECPA reform, 
acknowledging that the ECPA represents legislation passed 
when most of today’s technological pioneers were toddlers or 
young children.144  On March 19, 2013, Senator Patrick Leahy 
introduced the Electronic Communications Amendments Act 
of 2013 (“2013 Amendments Act”).145  Accompanied by 
bipartisan support, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
unanimously voted the ECPA Amendments Act of 2013 to 
move onto the full Senate for a vote on April 25, 2013.146 
The bill aims to amend several provisions of the ECPA.147  
Notably, the bill—as introduced—would generally prohibit 
both ECS and RCS providers from voluntarily disclosing its 
 
 141. See id. § 2702.  See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 139. 
 142. See id. 18 U.S.C. § 2073(c).  See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 139 (“non-
public service provider[s] . . . [are] not required to apply the exception 
permitting disclosures that are authorized by 2703 when [they] deal with a 
governmental entity.”). 
 143. See id. § 2703.  Kennedy, supra note 119, at 139 (“[communications], 
whether held on a public or private service, enjoy the privacy interests 
recognized by section 2703 when it imposes constraints on governmental 
access.”). 
 144. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on 
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy). 
 145. Electronic Communications Privacy Amendments Act of 2013, S. 607, 
113th Cong. (2013) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 25, 2013). 
 146. Senate Judiciary Panel Votes to Require Warrants for Police E-mail 
Searches, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS (Apr. 25, 2013), 
http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=7BAE62D0–B112–11E2–
98D7000C296BA163. 
 147. S. 607 §§ 2, 3 (2013). 
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customers’ electronic communications contents to 
governmental entities.148  While it would still retain the ECS-
RCS distinctions, it would adopt a uniform search warrant 
standard for production of customer electronic 
communications held in “electronic storage with or otherwise 
stored, held, or maintained by the provider.”149  The 
government must also promptly notify the customer whose 
content has been accessed via a third-party service provider, 
and consequently provide that user with a copy of the 
warrant and related information.150  Finally, the bill would 
eliminate the rule that allows the government to obtain e-
mails in electronic storage after 180 days.151 
VI. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
In theory, ECPA serves as a useful government tool; 
however, in its current state it is “hampered by conflicting 
standards that cause confusion for law enforcement, the 
business community, and American consumers alike.”152  The 
Senate Judiciary Committee observed in 1986 that “[p]rivacy 
cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or it 
will gradually erode as technology advances.”153  While 
increasingly more American households have access to 
broadband Internet, and while nearly 70 percent of 
Americans utilize Internet webmail, store data online, or use 
online software programs, the SCA has been largely 
unmodified to reflect these shifts.154  At the time Congress 
adopted the ECPA, there was no World Wide Web, and Mark 
Zuckerberg, who would grow to start Facebook, was merely 
 
 148. Id. § 3(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service of the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication that is in electronic storage with 
or otherwise stored, held, or maintained by the provider only if the 
governmental entity obtains a warrant.”).. 
 149. Id. § 3(a). 
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Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2013, DIGITAL DUE 
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 151. See S. 607 § 3 (2013). 
 152. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on 
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy). 
 153. S. REP., supra note 86, at 5. 
 154. See Scolnik, supra note 3, at 378. 
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two years old.155  Now, the law regulating Facebook is almost 
as old its founder.156 
Notable legal implications emanate from the SCA’s 
narrow scope.  Section 2703 provides the government with the 
unique occasion to circumvent long established privacy rights.  
It does not function as a catch-all statute that safeguards all 
stored Internet communications; rather, it is narrowly 
tailored to provide a set of Fourth Amendment-like 
protections to a very specific class of Internet 
communications.157  The ECS-RCS distinction does not 
capture all providers; as such, many cloud computing services 
either fluctuate between an ECS and RCS status or 
completely fall outside the SCA’s purview.158  Classifying 
cloud services as ECS, RCS, or neither impacts what rights 
the user has with respect to his or her data.  Unfortunately 
for cloud users who fall outside the SCA’s narrow scope, the 
courts’ jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment governs the 
privacy of their communications, and the existing case law 
under the third party doctrine does little to protect papers 
and documents increasingly stored in the cloud.159 
While the 1986 ECPA stands as one of our nation’s 
premiere privacy laws, it is painfully outdated.160  In the 
years since the ECPA’s enactment, technology has seen a 
dramatic, and arguably disruptive development as far as 
services available to electronic communications users.161  As 
technology has fundamentally changed the way we store and 
use information since 1986, the existing ECPA represents a 
very apparent disconnect between privacy expectations and 
statutory protections.162  There is no comprehensive federal 
legislation that sets statutory minimum requirements 
safeguarding users’ privacy and personal data in the cloud.163  
As such, the cloud threatens to undermine and delegitimize 
 
 155. Gerber, supra note 26, at 256. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Kerr, SCA User’s Guide, supra note 4, at 1214. 
 158. See William J. Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy 
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 160. See Gerber, supra note 26, at 257. 
 161. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 145. 
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the regulatory approaches to information privacy in the 
United States.164 
This disconnect spawned an uproar among various 
organizations, congressmen, companies, and Americans alike.  
The ECPA Amendments Act of 2013 is certainly well-received 
by the 1986 ECPA-critics; however, similar issues arising 
under the 1986 ECPA may likely manifest themselves in the 
2013 Amendments Act, should Congress enact the proposed 
bill.  To varying extents, both the ECPA and the 2013 
Amendment Act reflect the pre-Internet computing landscape 
seen by the 1980s.165  As the ways we communicate in the 
cloud computing arena place a tremendous strain on the 1986 
statutory dichotomies, the proposed amendments, while a 
considerable improvement from their predecessor, will 
continue to stifle cloud computing’s ability to achieve its 
future promise. 
VII. CLOUD COMPUTING UNDER THE 1986 ECPA & THE 
ECPA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2013 
As the past twenty-eight years since the ECPA’s 
enactment have seen numerous dramatic and statutorily 
disruptive developments in technology and electronic 
communications,166 this analysis will proceed by discussing 
the predominant flaws under the existing 1986 ECPA 
framework in the cloud computing arena, and then assess 
whether the ECPA Amendments Act of 2013 has the ability to 
remedy its predecessor’s shortcoming. 
This analysis will discuss four issues with respect to 
cloud computing, the existing legal framework, and the 
potential framework in light of the proposed amendments: (A) 
the definition of electronic storage, (B) the ECS-RCS 
distinction, (C) the corresponding 180-day rule for ECS 
communications, and (D) a doctrinal approach to the cloud 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
A. The Uncertain “Electronic Storage” Definition 
The SCA complicates the already muddled boundary of 
cloud-storage searches.167  The SCA protects the 
 
 164. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1646. 
 165. See Scolnik, supra note 3. 
 166. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 145. 
 167. See Mark Wilson, Castle in the Cloud: Modernizing Constitutional 
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communication provided the ECS provider maintains the 
communication in “electronic storage.”168 
The Department of Justice approach to “electronic 
storage” recognizes limited protection for electronic 
communications accessed by its recipient, not maintained in 
“electronic storage” by an ECS.169  Conversely, in finding that 
e-mails were “stored” by an ECS service within the meaning 
of the SCA, the Ninth Circuit determined that the second 
clause of the “electronic storage” definition applied to data 
only where it is stored for backup purposes.170  In dicta, the 
Ninth Circuit left open the inquiry as to whether “[a] remote 
computing service might be the only place a user stores his 
messages; in that case, the messages are not stored for 
backup purposes.”171 
By leaving this inquiry open, the Ninth Circuit 
essentially described the cloud-computing quandary: 
individuals use the cloud for numerous purposes, including, 
but not limited to, backing up information.172  Under this 
interpretation, such use of cloud services falls outside the 
purview of the SCA, as the data was not stored exclusively for 
“backup purposes.”173  Files stored on Google Docs and the 
like illustrate this dilemma.  Files stored on these servers are 
not necessarily stored for “backup purposes” and therefore are 
not in “electronic storage,” since the contents are “constantly 
updated as the software, installed on a user’s computer or 
smart phone, monitors the local file for changes and updates 
the server’s copy as necessary.”174 
As the Senate Judiciary Committee left this portion of 
the SCA untouched, the varying approaches to the “electronic 
storage” provision with respect to cloud computing 
necessarily mean that communications sent and maintained 
 
Protections for Cloud-Stored Data on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 261, 276 (2013). 
 168. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(2). 
 169. See Kattan, supra note 7, at 636 & n.155. 
 170. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (2003) (reasoning the 
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 171.  Id. at 1077. 
 172.  See Wilson, supra note 167, at 278. 
 173.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
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in the cloud will vary and drift outside the statutory purview 
of ECS-provider protection.175 
B. The ECS-RCS Distinction 
A cloud user’s constitutionally mandated privacy is 
predicated on the characterization of the cloud service 
provider and the particular content stored in that cloud under 
the ECPA’s complicated ECS-RCS analytical framework, 
which no longer bears any technological significance today.176  
This distinction becomes increasingly problematic where 
cloud services cannot be characterized as ECS or RCS, since 
contents of electronic communications falling outside these 
technical definitions “can [be] disclose[d] or use[d] with 
impunity.”177 
The justification proffered by Congress in drawing a 
distinction between ECS and RCS is that “by ‘renting’ 
computer storage space with a remote computing service, a 
customer places himself in the same situation as one who 
gives business records to an accountant.”178 
The inconsistent burdens of proof imposed on the 
government with respect to electronic communications—
particularly RCS—made sense when memory was scarce.179  
Service providers could assume that intended e-mail 
recipients effectively abandoned his or her e-mails after 180 
days.180  Likewise, the ECPA’s disparate treatment for 
information stored on businesses’ own computers—as opposed 
to a remote vendor—did not carry with it such dramatic 
implications as it does today.181  Congress’ justification is now 
inaccurate given the way in which Internet communication 
systems function.182 
The extent to which communications sent through cloud-
 
 175.  See Kattan, supra note 7, at 636. 
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based servers receive search warrant protection remains 
unclear as various cloud-based system-services present 
increasingly difficult cases.  As these cloud computing 
services tend to fall short of the SCA’s twin requirements for 
ECS communications, they do not enjoy the heightened 
protections afforded to ECS communications.183  Where ECS-
qualifying services must provide users with “the ability to 
send or receive . . . electronic communications,” many of 
today’s cloud services are programmed for purposes other 
than communication and lack any sending or receiving 
functionality.184  Moreover, as “electronic storage” is a term of 
art, cloud services fail to satisfy its narrow definition.185  
Contrary to the SCA’s requirement that the electronic storage 
exist as temporary and incidental to service, numerous cloud 
services offer users considerable storage capacity to facilitate 
long-term data retention.186  Furthermore, many cloud 
providers offer their storage service together with 
applications designed to access and deploy that data through 
remote computers.187  As cloud users’ content, with the very 
narrow exceptional e-mail category, is stored inconsistent 
with the twin ECS provider and “electronic storage 
requirements,” the heightened ECS protections are poorly 
suited for the cloud.188 
The existing RCS definition leaves its scope somewhat 
unclear.189  The SCA defines RCS as “the provision to the 
public of computer storage or processing services by means of 
an electronic communications system.”190  While computer 
storage is a relatively clear concept today, the question as to 
what constitutes a “processing service” posits a more trivial 
question especially with the invention of the World Wide 
Web.191  The legislative history indicates that such services 
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refer to outsourcing functions.192  To the extent computer 
networks existed in 1986, they predominately operated over 
proprietary facilities, not over systems controlled by third-
party vendors.193  Remote data processing did not yet exist as 
a means by which electronic communication and information 
was exchanged; rather, it was a method by which multiple 
users shared mainframe computers.194 
While the ECS characterization almost entirely excludes 
cloud services from its protection, a quick glance at the SCA’s 
RCS requirements leaves cloud users with false hope by 
initially availing their respective cloud provider to an RCS-
qualifying status.195  Most cloud providers offer—as the 
qualifying RCS providers must—public computer storage or 
processing services over a network.  Relying on the seemingly 
short analysis, some courts have applied the RCS provisions 
to cloud computing services, ostensibly consistent with legal 
scholars’ opinions and the SCA’s legislative history. 
While on its face, cloud computing satisfies the RCS 
requirements, the analysis used to reach this conclusion is 
inherently flawed: it neglects to account for the remaining 
requirements.196  There are five remaining prerequisites that 
must be satisfied to qualify as an RCS provider.197  It is 
commonplace for many cloud providers to adopt models that 
disregard the final two requirements, precluding an RCS 
qualification. 
Consider the fairly recent social networking 
phenomenon.  How should the site fall within the narrow 
SCA classifications where it stores and processes profile 
information (RCS-like), yet where it also permits 
communication among users (ECS-like)?198 
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Also consider how cloud services are profitable if they 
provide their services free of charge.  These providers often 
rely on some advertising revenue to fund their operations.  
While advertising does not violate the SCA’s requirements 
per se, numerous cloud providers provide targeted advertising 
opportunities where advertisers utilize targeted marketing 
campaigns that reach specific audiences by accessing the 
user’s website-visits.  This business model necessarily 
requires access to content, in contravention with the SCA’s 
“solely for the purposes of storage” mandate.199  Where 
customers authorize access to their data for such advertising 
services in exchange for free access to the cloud services, the 
SCA will not apply and the data will be subject to 
disclosure.200 
The implications of such classifications are sweeping, as 
RCS contents are never protected by a probable-cause 
standard.201  While the SCA fails to recognize this dichotomy, 
proprietary and confidential records stored within an RCS 
can be as sensitive and valuable as e-mails stored with an 
ECS.202  These distinctions neither conform to the reasonable 
expectation of Americans nor serve the public interest. 
While the Senate committee’s bill eliminates the tiered 
standards for ECS and RCS communications, it does not 
entirely remove the ECS-RCS terminology.  This can prove 
fatal because the approach still relies on definitions of 
obsolete technology where these distinctions no longer 
matter.203  Even under the proposed legislation, some cloud 
services can slip through the cracks and escape the ECPA’s 
protections in general. 
C. The ECS 180-Day Distinction 
Cloud computing platforms allow users to store e-mails 
on providers’ servers for increasing periods of time and 
sometimes indefinitely.204  In 2004, for example, Gmail 
provided users with one gigabyte of free storage.205  Now, 
almost a decade later, Gmail users enjoy fifteen gigabytes of 
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free storage.206  In spite of the seemingly infinite amount of 
free storage, the existing standard is still wedged in the 
crevices of 1986 technology.  In setting forth two varying 
levels of protection for e-mails on third party servers, existing 
users essentially surrender their reasonable expectation of 
privacy—and consequently their Fourth Amendment 
protection—between day 179 and 181.207  Where e-mails are 
stored on servers for 180 days or less, the government must 
fully comply with the Fourth Amendment by providing a 
search warrant supported by probable cause.  On the other 
hand, the government need only meet a Section 2703(d) 
standard—specific articulable facts—or a subpoena 
standard—reasonable relevance—to access e-mails stored on 
the server for over 180 days.208 
 While the existing law circumvents the Fourth 
Amendment in the 48-hour period between day 179 and 181, 
the technological circumstances have not always been as 
such.  The rationale for these distinctions are based in large 
part on 1986-era technology and the expectations those 
limitations created.209  When Congress enacted the ECPA in 
1986, e-mail service providers could not maintain customers’ 
e-mails on their servers for extended periods of time, as the 
storage capacity was significantly limited.210  “Most—if not 
all—electronic communication systems (such as electronic 
mail systems), however, only ke[pt] copies of messages for a 
few months.”211  Beyond that point, storage bore more 
resemblance to business records maintained by a third 
party.212   
 As the ECPA’s drafters gave customers a weak and 
arguably nonexistent expectation of privacy in the contents of 
their message, they likely assumed that any e-mails stored 
for over 180 days had never been retrieved.213  In 1986, ISPs 
stored user e-mails to the extent it was deemed necessary, 
i.e., until the user logged in and downloaded their mail.214 
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The reality of this statutory scheme is that customers 
who store their e-mails on their computer indefinitely are 
protected by a warrant requirement, yet users who access 
their e-mails in the cloud may not receive such protections, 
depending on the contents’ time in storage.215  It is also ironic 
that: 
[T]he e-mails or private messages that are both the most 
important and the most private are the older messages 
that you have read through several times and have 
intentionally decided to save . . . . By contrast, the 
unopened e-mails in your inbox are likely to be 
commercial solicitations that you have not yet had time to 
delete.”216 
This irony demonstrates that the SCA, as applied to e-mail, is 
unconstitutional.  The judiciary has been sluggish in 
recognizing Fourth Amendment protections for electronic 
information that would otherwise receive constitutional 
protection but-for its electronic character.217  United States v. 
Ferguson218 properly applied Section 2703 and Section 2705 
while concurrently undermining traditional Fourth 
Amendment protections.  During an investigation in 
Ferguson, the government discovered that Ferguson 
maintained accounts with both Yahoo! Mail and MSN 
Hotmail and successfully submitted a request to a magistrate 
to compel both services to produce all e-mails maintained in 
their storage for over 180 days.219  Given the ECPA’s 180-day 
requirement, e-mails held in storage for over 180 days were 
turned over without a warrant.220  Had Ferguson used a 
desktop application such as Microsoft Outlook with POP 
settings, they would have been unreachable by the ECPA and 
would not have been turned over to the government without a 
search warrant.221 
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Recently in United States v. Warshak,222 the Sixth Circuit 
recognized a Fourth Amendment right for e-mails stored 
within an ISP.  There, the United States procured 27,000 of 
Warshak’s e-mails utilizing an administrative subpoena 
pursuant to the SCA that ultimately led to Warshak’s mail 
and bank fraud convictions.223  The Sixth Circuit found that 
while Warshak had privacy protections under the Fourth 
Amendment, the government’s reliance on the SCA precluded 
reversing Warshak’s conviction.224  Nevertheless, the court 
held “to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the 
government to obtain such e-mails warrantlessly, the SCA is 
unconstitutional.”225 
Together, Ferguson and Warshak represent the very 
disconnect between the ECPA and modern technology.  The 
balance struck by Congress in 1986 falls severely out of 
alignment in light of the advent of cloud computing and 
increased online storage capacities.  This distinction merely 
puts an increasing amount of user data within law 
enforcement’s reach, requiring lower, and arguably 
unconstitutional, burdens of proof.226  Federal statutory 
protection for e-mails should not depend on how the users 
choose to store their e-mail.227 
Acknowledging that distinguishing privacy protections 
based on a stored-content’s age bears no logic in light of 
today’s cloud computing capabilities, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee struck the 180-day requirement in the ECPA 
Amendments Act of 2013.228  Under the proposed bill, users 
who opt to leave their e-mails in the cloud do not suffer a 
decrease in privacy protections.229  This legislation would not 
discriminate against those utilizing the cloud paradigm; as 
such, users’ data would remain confidential and could only be 
accessed with due process of law.230 
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D. The Fourth Amendment Application to the Cloud 
Applying the Fourth Amendment to any cloud service 
proliferates confusion.  Smith, Miller, and Couch establish 
that the third party doctrine precludes some legitimate 
privacy expectation where the third party is a business.231  
The implications that arise from the Fourth Amendment’s 
caveat is that where a user transmits electronic 
communications over a third party’s server, the government 
may approach the third party to produce documents, all while 
remaining consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.232 
Notwithstanding the third party doctrine, several recent 
decisions involving the Fourth Amendment protection in the 
cloud arena manifest the lower courts’ willingness to extend 
Fourth Amendment protection to the cloud.233  In Quon v. 
Arch Wireless Operating Co., the court emphasized the 
importance of an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
with respect to the item seized or the area searched.234 
Although the United States Supreme Court reversed—
leaving unaddressed the reasonable expectation of privacy 
issue—the lower courts seemingly demonstrate their 
deference for the increasing importance of online 
environments by applying the Fourth Amendment to the 
individual, irrespective of the situation.235  Moreover, the 
current Fourth Amendment framework does not necessarily 
preclude the courts from continuing to apply this methodology 
to the cloud.  Miller and Smith do not control the cloud issue 
specifically.  Storing one’s data on a third-party server is not 
analogous to conducting business with a bank, and an IP 
address is not comparable to a telephone number.236 
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Despite this emerging judicial pattern, the courts should 
not be expected to traverse the intricate technological 
landscapes.  Given that Congress has the benefit of 
overwhelming industry input, statutory guidance will yield 
more accurate and exacting standards.  Accordingly, the 
initial reform in the cloud-computing arena must originate in 
the legislature. 
VIII. CLEARING THE AIR: HOW TO MAKE WAY FOR THE 
CLOUD 
While the Senate Judiciary Committee passed the ECPA 
Amendments Act of 2013 with overwhelming accord, there is 
no guarantee that Congress will enact the legislation, 
considering they failed to pass similar amendments in 
2011.237  The ECPA Amendments Act of 2013 is certainly a 
step in the right direction; however, as the aforementioned 
analysis indicates, it does not offer adequate remedies for the 
existing cloud-privacy concerns. 
Limiting the Fourth Amendment’s application to the 
online environment and narrowly construing the SCA 
language would severely constrict the benefits offered by 
cloud computing and undermine individuals’ and companies’ 
trust in the technology.238  One of the primary advantages 
that the United States would gain in adopting new cloud-
computing laws would be a coherent legal framework that 
replaces the archaic and fragmented statutory schemes that 
currently govern.239  The ECPA should undergo a 
comprehensive amendment process that provides fluid 
emerging technologies the same protections as their existing 
equivalents.  In doing so, however, Congress must achieve a 
balance between protecting user-privacy rights and avoiding 
unduly cumbersome provisions that restrict the free flow of 
data that is the essence of cloud computing.240 An effective 
solution must underscore using and strengthening the 
existing legal frameworks under both the Fourth Amendment 
and the ECPA, as well as using these foundations to oversee 
the doctrines’ application to the cloud paradigm and emerging 
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technologies.241 
While industry leaders overwhelmingly advocate for 
reform that includes increased privacy, law critics favor 
private sector accommodations over legislative approaches.242  
Such critics argue that proposed privacy regulations interfere 
with the private relationship between ISPs and their 
customers, disrupt the free-market for electronic 
communications service, and reason that “protecting privacy 
imposes real costs.”243  Although critics express their 
discomfort with government interference in the consumer-
industry relationship, this arguably narrow view neglects to 
address the significant costs imposed by the cloud’s weak 
privacy protections.  The cloud’s appeal is its innovative 
technology and overwhelming flexibility.244  Inadequate 
privacy protection, particularly in the cloud’s early stage, will 
not only moot its flexibility, but will also impede innovation.  
Excessive government accessibility to the cloud is imprudent, 
as consumer and industry trust in cloud computing cannot be 
undermined.245  Addressing the current shortcomings of cloud 
privacy legislation necessarily requires entrusting the entities 
with the appropriate faculties to remedy the statutory 
deficiencies.246 
As the ECPA Amendments Act of 2013 and the analysis 
above indicate, the 180-day ECS distinction and the lowered 
protection for RCS communications serve no legitimate 
purpose.  The 180-day distinction and corresponding tiered 
standards for ECS communications essentially eviscerate one 
of the cloud’s premiere advantages: increased capacity.247  
Similarly, the lowered protection afforded to RCS 
communications is arguably unconstitutional. 
In conjunction with removing the 180-day rule and tiered 
privacy standards for different communications, Congress 
should also eliminate the SCA’s ECS-RCS distinction and 
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provide a unified technology and transmission neutral 
definition.  “Tech neutrality” is a concept where, regardless of 
future developments in communication technology, the 
presence and application of the ECPA remain constant.248  
This type of approach would provide equitable protection to 
current and future technology alike.249  A “tech neutral” 
definition in place of the ECS-RCS terminology should read to 
apply for all content, transmitted under any Internet 
medium, whether stored or otherwise maintained for any 
length of time.250  Under this framework, user data stored and 
processed in the cloud would receive the same level of 
protection regardless of the platform or business model used 
to generate, communicate, or store the data.251 
A. Proposed Amendment for Definitions Under the SCA 
The proposed amendments for definitions would involve 
eliminating electronic communication service and remote 
computing serviced definitions and replacing them with a 
unified definition under the term “Internet Communication 
Service.”  The amendment would also revise the definition of 
“electronic storage.”  The amendments would read as follows: 
§ 2510(15) Internet Communication Service  
(A) any service which provides users, customers, or 
subscribers with ability to send, receive, store, or otherwise 
maintain wire or electronic communications. 
§  2510(17) “Electronic Storage”  
(A) any wire or electronic communication that is stored 
electronically or otherwise held, stored, or maintained by the 
Internet Communication Service for any purpose of such 
communication. 
B. Proposed Amendment for Disclosures Under the SCA 
The proposed amendments for the voluntary and 
compelled disclosures incorporate the above amended 
terminology, abolish the 180-day distinction, and require a 
search warrant supported by probable cause for all content.  
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The amendments would read as follows: 
§ 2702: Voluntary Disclosure 
(a) Prohibitions.  Except as provided in subsection (b) or 
(c), 
(1) an Internet Communication Service or its agent shall 
not knowingly divulge to any person or entity either the 
contents or records of that communication information 
pertaining to a user, customer of or subscriber to such service. 
§ 2703: Compelled Disclosure 
(a) Contents of an Internet Communication Service in 
electronic storage.  A governmental entity may require 
disclosure by a provider of Internet Communication Service of 
the contents of a wire or electronic communication in its 
electronic storage only if the governmental entity obtains a 
warrant issued according to the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State 
court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of 
competent jurisdiction directing the disclosure. 
CONCLUSION: BLUE SKIES AHEAD 
While the ECPA is nearly thirty years old, it functioned 
as a progressive and enlightening statutory framework in the 
years immediately following its enactment.252  This past 
decade’s dramatic technological innovations have wreaked 
havoc through the ECPA to the extent that it is inflexible and 
no longer sustainable.  Congress must promote innovation in 
the cloud arena, and the only way to accomplish that objective 
is to accommodate the past decade’s technological leaps.  The 
law should be concerned exclusively with personal data, 
regardless of user-choice as to storage or other data 
maintenance.253 
It is crucial that Congress develop a clear understanding 
with respect to the existing murky categories and 
distinctions.  In doing so, Congress should conform to user-
and-industry-reasonable expectations of privacy.  In effect, 
the above-amended statutes would not provide cloud users 
preferential treatment; rather, it would provide equal process 
under the law.254  These proposed revisions do not foreclose 
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flexibility from its framework.  It fosters the ability to 
innovate, protects consumer interests, and at the same time 
equips law enforcement personnel with coherent standards 
necessary to carry out their legitimate needs in the new 
technological era. 
By making the ECPA “tech neutral,” Congress can send a 
message to individuals, companies, and global governments 
that they can safely use current cloud platforms and future 
platforms without compromising their users’ data privacy. 
 
